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Abstract:  
This paper contributes in economic literature by investigating the impact of defence spending on 
income inequality in a case of Iran using time series data over the period of 1969-2011. For this 
purpose, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration for long run 
relationship in the presence of structural breaks arising in the series. The stationarity properties 
of the variables are tested using structural break unit root tests. The causal relationship between 
defence spending and income inequality is examined by employing the VECM Granger causality 
approach. Our findings validate the long run relationship between the series. The results 
indicated that defence spending improves income distribution in Iran. An inverted-U shaped 
relationship exists between defence spending and income inequality. Economic growth 
deteriorates income inequality. The causality analysis reveals that defence spending Granger 
causes income inequality and feedback effect exists between income inequality and economic 
growth.   
 
Keywords; Defense Spending, Income Inequality  
Introduction 
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The mechanism on relationship between the rise in military spending and income distribution is 
simple. Actually wages of labour employed in defense or defense related industries is high with 
rise in defense spending. Wages will be increased during the inter-industry dispersion as rents 
paid by the industry to inelastic portion of personnel (working in defense industry) rises. On 
contrary, initially wages are high in defense or defense linked industry while relative wages will 
be low with the reduction in defense spending that leads to decline in income inequality. The 
efficiency wage theory asserts that workforce enjoys high wages in defense or defense related 
industry. This implies that defense spending and income inequality are endogenous variables 
(Ali, 2003, 2007). 
 
Opportunity Cost Burden Effect Model reveals a trade-off between increased in defense 
spending and reduced spending on development projects that tends to increase income inequality 
in the society. It is documented that income inequality in the society is affected with low social 
and human development with the rise in military spending on the cost of diminishing returns on 
social sector’s development. In long span of time, positive impact of government spending is 
nullified if productive resources of an economy transferred for financial support of the military 
spending. The rapid increase in military expenditures leads to rise in total government spending 
fastly. There is also a cost of rapid increase of defense spending because it forces the government 
to lower down the spending on the development projects (Chaitanya, 2008). This shows that 
“cost of best alternative use (opportunity cost) is forgone by the country as it diverts 
development spending towards funding the defense sector growth requirement” (Chaitanya, 
2008)1. 
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The main objective of present study is to examine the effect on defence spending on income 
distribution over the period of 1969-2011 in case of Iran. This study contributes to existing 
literature by five-folds: (i) pioneering effort investigating the relationship between military 
spending and income inequality by incorporating economic growth in inequality function in case 
of Iran; (ii) we apply structural break unit root tests to test stationarity properties of the 
variables2; (iii) we also utilize the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration in the 
presence of structural break in the series for long run relationship between the variables; (iv) 
OLS and ECM approaches are used to analyze long run and short run dynamics between the 
series; (v) the direction of causality between the variables is examined by applying the VECM 
Granger causality approach. Our findings report that cointegration between the variables exists 
for long run relationship in case of Iran. Military spending reduces income inequality while 
inverted-U hypothesis between military spending and income inequality is validated. Economic 
growth worsens income distribution. There is bidirectional causality found between economic 
growth and income inequality and military spending Granger causes income inequality.   
 
The rest balance of study is organized as following: section-II presents the review of literature, 
empirical model is constructed in section-III as well as estimation strategy, section-IV deals with 
results and their discussion, conclusion and policy implications are drawn in section-V. 
II. Review of Literature 
On the basis of previous literature, there are many studies based on the association between 
military spending and economic growth3. There is still lacking in the field of military spending 
and income distribution. The efforts were made to explore the relationship between income 
inequality and political institutional conditions. Gradtien et al. (2001) reported that 
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democratization environment of political institutions causes to improve income distribution. 
Further, they concluded that strong correlation between smooth functioning of democratic 
institution and higher wage rate decline income inequality. These results are supported by Lipset 
et al. (1993); Diamand, (1992) and Rodrik, (1999). Dinardo et al. (1996) showed that de-
unionization is an important factor to perk up the wage inequality. There are numerous factors 
that affect the wage condition in economy like, relative decentralization of the wage-setting 
mechanism, institutional policies towards labour laws wage adjustment. Loony, (1990) 
determined the interaction between military/civilian regime and socio-economic performance. 
The results indicated that LDCs having a higher defense burden because these nation has large 
proportion of budget spending on the military needs. Similarly; Melman, (1974) documented that 
high income inequality is the economic cost of permanent war. Income transfer programs and 
military spending on federal budget deficit has been discussed by Seiglie, (1997) for US 
economy. Seiglie reported that defense spending and budget deficits are linked positively. 
Budget deficit is used to make income distribution more equal between black and white people. 
 
Our interest is to explore the studies investigating the relationship between military spending and 
income inequality. For example; Abell, (1994) explored the relationship between military 
spending and income inequality using data of United States by applying OLS regression. His 
finding unveiled that military spending worsens income inequality by controlling other some 
macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, taxes, interest rates, non-military spending 
and inflation. After that, Ali and Galbraith, (2003) used panel regression to investigate the 
impact of GDP growth, per capita income, size of armed forces and military spending on income 
distribution. Their results indicated that military spending increases income inequality. Comton 
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(2005) noted a negative relationship between military spending and income inequality in United 
States. He unveiled that increase in military spending generates more jobs for unskilled workers 
and improves income distribution in the country. Additionally, Henderson et al. (2008) 
illustrated that cut in military spending increases income inequality. They claimed that 
employing the people in productive sectors and less productive sectors proportionately contribute 
to income inequality in United States. Chaitanya, (2007) explored the relationship between 
military spending on income distribution using data of South Asia using model based on 
opportunity cost burden effect theory4. His panel regression analysis sported the view that 
military spending, arms imports and armed forces deteriorate income inequality. In case of 
Turkey; Ozsoy, (2008) noted that budget deficit is negatively correlated with transfer payments 
programs. Huge increase in military spending, education, health spending seemed to force 
budget deficit to worsen which in resulting increases income inequality. Latter on, Elveren, 
(2012) confirmed the findings of Ozsoy, (2008) by reporting that military spending Granger 
causes income inequality. However, in another study on military spending and income inequality 
Lin and Ali, (2009) applied panel Granger non-causality test but did not find any causal 
relationship between said variables. 
 
Hirnissa et al. (2009) used the data of ASEAN countries to examine the impact of military 
spending on income inequality by applying the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration 
for long run relationship between the variables5. Their results indicated that the variables are 
cointegrated for long run relationship. Military spending Granger causes income inequality in 
Malaysia, feedback effect is found between both variables in case of Singapore and neutral 
relationship exists between military spending and income distribution in rest countries such as 
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Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and South Korea. Ali, (2012) used the data of Middle 
Eastern and North Africans (MENA) countries to examine the effect of defence spending on 
income distribution. Ali reported that military spending improves income distribution and 
income inequality and economic growth have negative affect on military spending.  Kentor et al. 
(2012) introduced high-tech weaponry as “new” military and used the military expenditure per 
solders as a proxy of military capital intensiveness for 82 developed and less developed 
countries. Their results pointed out that high-tech military spending exacerbates income 
inequality. Recently, Elveren, (2012) used Turkish data on military spending and income 
inequality to test direction of causal relationship between both series. The Engle-Granger 
cointegration and causality approaches were applied. Results indicated a long run relationship 
between military spending and income inequality and defence spending Granger causes income 
distribution i.e. rise in military spending leads higher income inequality. There is no study in 
case of Iran investigating the relationship between military spending and income inequality. This 
study is humble effort to fill gap regarding Iranian economy. 
 
III- Modeling, Methodological Framework and Data Collection  
This study aims to investigate the link between defence spending and income inequality. Our 
model includes economic growth as an additional contributing factor towards income inequality 
and takes the following form:  
 
),( ttt YDfIE                                                                    (1) 
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Where tIE  denotes income inequality, tD  denotes defence spending and tY  denotes economic 
growth. In order to curtail acuity in the data and achieve consistent and reliable results we have 
transformed the entire series into its log-linear specification using logarithm (Shahbaz, 2010). 
The empirical model takes the following form: 
 
ittt YDIE   lnlnln 321                             (2) 
 
Where tIEln , is natural log of income inequality proxied by Gini-coefficient, tDln  is the natural 
log of defence spending per capita, tYln is natural log of economic growth proxied by real GDP 
per capita, and   is residual term having zero mean and finite variance. In order to test for the 
nonlinear relationship, the squared term of defence spending is added to the model which is as 
following: 
 
ttttt YDDIE   lnlnlnln 442332211      (3) 
 
In equation-3, if: 033  and 044   then income inequality is decreasing, 033  and 044   
then income inequality is increasing, 033  and 044   then inverted-U shaped hypothesis is 
confirmed, 033  and 044   U-shaped relationship is accepted 
 
Historically, in order to test stationarity properties of the variables, unit root tests such as ADF 
by Dickey and Fuller (1979), P-P by Philips and Perron (1988), KPSS by Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992), DF-GLS by Elliott et al. (1996) and Ng-Perron by Ng-Perron, (2001) have been used. 
However, due to lack of information on structural break points, these tests produce unreliable 
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results. To remove this anomaly, Zivot-Adndrews, (1992) suggested another model that allows to 
accommodate single unknown structural break in the variables at level form, in the slope of trend 
component, and in the intercept and trend function. Using Zivot-Andrews, (1992) model the 
structural break in the series can be checked as: 
 


 
k
j
tjtjttt xdcDUbtaxax
1
1    (5)      


 
k
j
tjtjttt xdbDTctbxbx
1
1         (6) 


 
k
j
tjtjtttt xddDTdDUctcxcx
1
1     (7)  
 
Where tDU  denotes dummy variable and gives the mean shift incurred at each point while tDT  
denotes trend shift variable.  
 




TBtif
TBtif
DU t ...0
...1
and 



TBtif
TBtifTBt
DUt ...0
...
 
 
 The null hypothesis of unit root break date is 0c which indicates that series is not stationary 
with a drift not having information about structural break point while  0c  hypothesis implies 
that the variable is found to be trend-stationary with one unknown time break. Zivot-Andrews 
unit root test fixes all points as potential for possible time break and does estimation through 
regression for all possible break points successively. Then, this unit root test selects that time 
break which decreases one-sided t-statistic to test 1)1(ˆ  cc . Zivot-Andrews intimate that in 
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the presence of end points, asymptotic distribution of the statistics is diverged to infinity point. It 
is necessary to choose a region where end points of sample period are excluded. Further, Zivot-
Andrews suggested the trimming regions i.e. (0.15T, 0.85T) are followed.  
 
Clemente et al. (1998) improved on Perron and Volgelsang, (1992) methodology to allow for 
two structural breaks and better handles the problems due to structural breaks compared to 
Perron and Volgelsang, (1992); Zivot-Andrews, (1992), unit root tests which can handle series 
with only one potential structural break. The null hypothesis 0H and alternate aH are as follows: 
 
 
ttttt DTBaDTBaxxH   221110 :         (8) 
 
tttta DTBbDUbuxH  2211:         (9) 
 
Where  tDTB1  denotes pulse variable which is 1 if 1 iTBt or else 0, and  1itDU  if 
)2,1(  itTBi  or else 0. Mean modification is shown by 1TB  and 2TB time periods. For 
simplicity, we assume that )2,1(  iTTB ii   where 01  i while 21    (Clemente et al. 
1998). If case of two structural breaks contained by an innovative outlier the unit root hypothesis 
can be tested using the following model:   
 
t
k
i tjtttttt
xcDUdDUdDTBaDTBdxux      1 1241322111   (10) 
10 
 
 
This model gives minimum value of t-ratio using simulations and then constraining the value of 
autoregressive parameter to 1 the value of simulated t-ratio can be used to mark all break points. 
To derive asymptotic distribution of the estimate, it is assumed that 012   , 02 11    
where, 1 and 2 have the values in interval i.e. ]/)1(,/)2[( TTTt  by applying the largest 
window size. The assumption i.e. 121   is used to show that cases where break points exist 
in repeated periods are purged (see Clemente et al. 1998). Two steps approach is used to test the 
unit root hypothesis, if shifts can explain the additive outliers. In the first step the deterministic 
trend is removed as follows:  
 
 
xDUdDUdux ttt
 2615        (11) 
 
In the second step minimum t-ratio is calculated to verify whether 1  as follow: 
 
       ki ki ttittiki tit xcxDTBDTBx 1 1 111221 111      (12) 
 
A dummy variable is included in the estimation to ensure that ),(min 21  tIOt congregates in 
distribution: 
 
2
1
2
1
121
21
)]([
inf),(min
K
Ht
t
IO

  

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Since traditional approaches to cointegration have certain demerits, we have used the 
autoregressive distributed lag model or the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration 
accommodating the structural break stemming in the series. The ARDL bounds testing approach 
to cointegration has certain merits like it is flexible regarding integrating order of the variables 
whether variables are found to be stationary at I(1) or I(0) or I(1) / I(0). In addition, Monte Carlo 
investigation confirms that this approach is better suited for small sample size (Pesaran and Shin, 
1999). Moreover, a dynamic unrestricted error correction model (UECM) can be derived from 
the ARDL bounds testing through a simple linear transformation. The UECM integrates the short 
run dynamics with the long run equilibrium without losing any information for long run. The 
empirical equation of the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration is given below: 
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Where, denotes difference operator, s denotes residual terms, and DUM denotes dummy 
variable to capture the structural breaks arising in the series6.  F-statistics are computed to 
compare with upper and lower critical bounds generated by Pesaran et al. (2001) to test for 
existence of cointegration. The null hypothesis to examine the existence of long run relationship 
between the variables is 0:0  YDIEH   against alternate hypothesis is 
0:  YDIEaH   of cointegration for equation-4. Using Pesaran et al. (2001) critical bounds, 
if computed F-statistic is more than upper critical bound (UCB) there is cointegration between 
the variables. If computed F-statistic does not exceed lower critical bound (LCB) the variables 
are not cointegrated for long run relationship. If computed F-statistic falls between lower and 
upper critical bounds then decision regarding cointegration between the variables is uncertain. 
However, since our sample size is small (43 observations), critical bounds generated by Pesaran 
et al. (2001) may be inappropriate to take decision whether cointegration exists or not. Therefore, 
we use lower and upper critical bounds developed by Narayan, (2005). The stability tests, to 
scrutinize stability of the ARDL bounds testing estimates, have been applied i.e. CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ (Brown et al. 1975). 
 
The ARDL bounds testing approach can be used to estimate long run relationships between the 
variables. For instance, if there is cointegration in equation-4 where income inequality ( tIE ), 
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defence spending ( tD ) and economic growth ( tY ) are used as forcing variables then there is 
established long run relationship between the variables that can be molded in following equation 
given below: 
 
ittt YDIE   lnlnln 210    (18) 
 
where 121110 /,/,/  YDIE   and t is the error term supposed to be 
normally distributed. These long run estimates are computed using the ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration when income inequality ( tIE ) treated dependent variables. This model 
can be further improved by including other dependent variables. On confirmation of long run 
relationship, it is important to find the direction of causality as below: 
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Where  (1 )L  denotes the difference operator and ECTt-1 denotes the  lagged residual term 
generated from long run relationship, tt 21 , and t3 are error terms assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. The long run causality is indicated by 
the significance of t-statistic connecting to the coefficient of error correction term ( 1tECT ) and 
statistical significance of F-statistic in first differences of the variables shows the evidence of 
short run causality between variables. Additionally, joint long-and-short runs causal relationship 
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can be estimated by joint significance of both 1tECT  and the estimate of lagged independent 
variables. For instance, iib  0,12  shows that defence spending Granger-causes income 
inequality and causality is running from income inequality to defence spending indicated 
by iib  0,21 .  
 
The study covers the period of 1965-2011. The data on real GDP per capita, real military 
spending per capita and Gini-coefficient (income inequality), has been sourced from world 
development indicators (CD-ROM, 2012).  
 
IV- Results and their Discussion  
Descriptive statistics of income inequality ( tIEln ), economic growth ( tYln ) and defense 
spending ( tDln ) are presented in Table-1. While sample means of economic growth and defense 
spending are positive, it is negative when income inequality is considered. Skewness and 
kurtosis are measure the shape of the distribution. Positive skewness illustrates that all the series 
are right-skewed. The value of kurtosis indicates that they are leptokurtic relative to a normal 
distribution. Jarque-Bera results show that the null hypothesis of normal distribution cannot be 
rejected implying that income inequality ( tIEln ), economic growth ( tYln ) and defense spending 
( tDln ) have normal distributions with finite variance. The correlation analysis indicates that 
economic growth is positively correlated with income inequality. The negative correlation is 
found between defence spending and income distribution. There is a positive correlation between 
defence spending and economic growth.  
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Table-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables  tIEln  tYln  tDln  
 Mean -0.8834  15.4696  11.5537
 Median -0.9105  15.4323  11.4443
 Maximum -0.6891  15.8075  12.4023
 Minimum -1.0936  15.0898  11.0468
 Std. Dev.  0.0853  0.1935  0.3748 
 Skewness  0.5470  0.0746  0.7974 
 Kurtosis  3.2455  2.0030  2.5512 
 Jarque-Bera  2.1481  1.7359  3.6893 
 Probability  0.3416  0.4198  0.1958 
tIEln   1.0000   
tYln   0.3067  1.0000  
tDln  -0.1132  0.4263  1.0000 
 
 
Log-run results are shown in Table-5. Our findings indicate that all coefficients are according to 
our expectations and statistically significant. Furthermore, there is a negative relationship 
between defense spending and income inequality is found. It is noted that all else is same, a 1 per 
cent increase in defence spending will decline income inequality by 0.1167 per cent. This 
relationship is statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance. These findings are 
contradictory with Abell, (1994) for US; Ali and Galbraith, (2003) for global data; Chaitanya, 
(2007) for South Asia; Ozsoy, (2008) for Turkey; Henderson et al. (2008) for; Kentor et al. 
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(2012) for 82 developed countries but consistent with Comton, (2005) for US; Ali, (2011) for 
Eastern and North Africans (MENA) countries. The impact of economic growth on income 
inequality is positive and it is statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance. A 1 per 
cent increase in economic growth exacerbates income inequality by 0.2536 per cent keeping 
other things constant. These findings are consistent with Musai et al. (2011) and Keivani, (2011) 
in case of Iran.   
 
Furthermore, we have included squared term of defence spending i.e. 2ln tD  to examine non-linear 
relationship between defence spending and income inequality. Our empirical exercise shows that 
inverted U-shaped relationship between defense spending and income inequality is found in case 
of Iran. It is noted that signs of linear and nonlinear terms are positive and negative respectively 
and statistically significant at 5 per cent level. This implies that a 1 per cent increase in defence 
spending increases income inequality by 4.7783 per cent (shown by linear term) while negative 
sign of squared term of defence spending (shown by nonlinear term) verifies the delinking point 
of income inequality and defence spending. The lower segment of Table-5 reveals that residual 
term is normally distributed with constant variance and zero mean. There is no serial correlation 
between dependent variables and residual term and, same inference can be drawn for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). No evidence is found for the existence of 
white heteroskedasticity. Moreover, model is well articulated confirmed by Ramsey reset test 
statistic. 
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Table-5: Long Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tIEln  
Model  Linear Model Nonlinear Model 
Variables Coefficient T. Statistic Coefficient T. Statistic 
Constant -3.4604* -3.7023 -31.0496** -2.3862 
tDln  -0.1167* -3.0168 4.7783** 2.1381 
2ln tD  ….  ….  -0.2059** -2.1607 
tYln  0.2536* 3.5395 0.1594** 2.2937 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.2813 …. 0.2407 …. 
F-statistic 7.0454* …. 3.6986** …. 
NORMAL2  1.4023 (0.4960) 0.8653 (0.6486) 
SERIAL2  1.7638 (0.1144) 1.4306 (0.2220) 
ARCH2  2.0359 (0.3250) 1.8759 (0.1305) 
RAMSEY2  0.3449 (0.5607) 1.5443 (0.2224) 
Note: * and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
NORM2 is for normality test, SERIAL2 for LM serial correlation test, ARCH2 for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and REMSAY2 for Resay Reset test. 
 
Short-run dynamics investigated by applying the error correction model (ECM). Table-6 
illustrates the results of both linear and nonlinear models. The linear model shows that defence 
spending has positive impact on income inequality but it is statistically insignificant. The 
positive effect is found of economic growth on income inequality and significant at 5 per cent. 
This implies that by 1 per cent increase in economic growth deteriorates income distribution by 
0.3681 per cent. The nonlinear model indicates that inverted-U shaped relationship between 
defence spending and income inequality exists but it is insignificant. The coefficient of 1tECM  
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indicates short run deviations towards long run equilibrium path. The sign of lagged error term of 
linear and nonlinear models are significant in 5% level. The coefficient of 1tECM  is 0.3958 for 
linear and 0.4182 for nonlinear model. This means that deviations in short run towards long run 
are corrected by 39.58 and 41.82 per cent per year for linear and nonlinear models respectively.  
 
Table-6: Short Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tIEln  
Model  Linear Model Nonlinear Model 
Variables Coefficient T. Statistic Coefficient T. Statistic 
Constant -0.0069 -0.7039 -0.0033 -0.2766 
tDln  0.0549 1.1228 0.0479 0.8760 
2ln tD  ….  ….  -0.0982 -0.4815 
tYln  0.3681** 2.2347 0.3825** 2.6146 
1tECM  -0.3958** 2.8034 -0.4182** -2.7843 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.3111 …. 0.3159 …. 
F-statistic 5.1201* …. 3.8113** …. 
NORMAL2  1.0750 (0.2908) 0.8533 (0.6300) 
SERIAL2  0.3099 (0.5814) 0.3155 (0.5781) 
ARCH2  1.8146 (0.1746) 1.8450 (0.1739) 
RAMSEY2  0.2447 (0.6600) 2.1113 (0.1224) 
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Note: * and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
NORM2 is for normality test, SERIAL2 for LM serial correlation test, ARCH2 for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and REMSAY2 for Resay Reset test. 
 
The lower segment of Table-6 reveals that short run models seem to pass all diagnostic tests. The 
results illustrate that error terms are normally distributed with constant variance and zero mean 
for both models. No serial correlation is found between dependent variables and residual term. 
There is no evidence about the existence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) and white heteroskedasticity. Moreover, both models are well specified validated by 
Ramsey reset test statistic. 
 
The VECM Granger Causality Analysis  
Casual relationship between income inequality, defense spending and growth is investigated by 
applying the VECM Granger approach. Knowledge about the direction of causality between the 
series can help policy makers in crafting an integrated and sustainable environmental policy. 
Granger, (1969) suggested if the series are first difference stationary and cointegrated the 
VECM. The results are detailed in Table-7. Our estimated 1tECM  coefficients are significant 
with negative sign for income inequality and economic growth equations. It reveals that the 
shock exposed by system converging to long run equilibrium path at a higher speed for income 
inequality (-0.5095) the VECM as compared to adjustment speed of economic growth (-0.1785) 
the VECM. 
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The causality analysis reveals that in long run, defence spending Granger causes income 
inequality. These findings are consistent with existing literature such as Ozsoy, (2008) and 
Elveren, (2012) for Turkey; Hirnissa et al. (2009) for ASEAN countries. The feedback effect is 
found between economic growth and income inequality. The unidirectional causality exists 
running from defence spending to economic growth. This empirical finding is consistent with 
Dunne and Vougas, (1999) for South Africa; Kollias et al. (2007) for European Union; Karagol 
and Palaz, (2004) and Karagianni and Pempetzoglu, (2009) for Turkey; Shahbaz and Shabbir, 
(2012) for Pakistan but contradictory with Tiwari and Shahbaz, (2012) for India; Shahbaz et al. 
(2012) for Pakistan and Farzanegan, (2012) for Iran.   
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Table-7: The VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Dependent  
Variable 
Direction of Causality 
Short Run Long Run Joint Long-and-Short Run Causality 
1ln  tIE  1ln  tD  2 1ln  tD  1ln  tY  1tECT  11,ln  tt ECTIE 11,ln  tt ECTD 121,ln  tt ECTD 11,ln  tt ECTY
tIEln  
…. 
2.6567*** 
[0.0872] 
2.9813***
[0.0664] 
2.3277 
[0.1155] 
-0.5095** 
[-2.9714] …. 
2.3154*** 
[0.0966] 
2.2875*** 
[0.0966] 
2.9013** 
[0.0517] 
tDln  2.4407*** 
[0.1042] …. 
5.9470* 
[0.041] 
0.7798 
[0.4675] 
 
…. 
 
…. …. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
2ln tD  2.5400*** 
[0.1001] 
7.0181* 
[0.0010] …. 
1.2501 
[0.3014] 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. …. 
 
…. 
tYln  3.4881** 
[0.0440] 
1.4879 
[0.2589] 
1.7915 
[0.1853] …. 
-0.1784** 
[-2.3483] 
4.0750** 
[0.0161] 
2.3423*** 
[0.0946] 
2.6161*** 
[0.0707] …. 
Note: *, ** and *** show significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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The bidirectional causality exists between income inequality and defense spending in short run. 
In short run, the unidirectional causal relationship is found running from income inequality to 
economic growth. Furthermore, our results validated the existence of inverted-U shaped 
relationship between defence spending and income inequality as both linear and nonlinear terms 
of defence spending Granger cause income inequality in short run as well as long run. 
 
V- Conclusion and Policy implications 
This paper has assessed the relationship between defense spending and income inequality in Iran 
using annual data over the period of 1969-2011. In doing so, the ARDL bound testing approach 
to cointegration in the presence of structural break is applied after confirming integrating order 
of the variables by using structural break unit root test. Our cointegration analysis shows that 
there is a long run relationship between defense spending, economic growth and income 
inequality. Furthermore, defense spending improves income distribution in Iran. An inverted-U 
shaped relationship between defense spending and income inequality is also existed. Economic 
growth increases income inequality. The causality analysis points out that military spending 
Granger causes income distribution. This confirmed the existence of an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between defence spending and income inequality. The feedback hypothesis is 
validated between economic growth and income inequality.  
 
With the notice to the negative effects of defense spending on income inequality, it seems that in 
Iran defense sector is much more attractive for people belongs to low income groups in 
comparison with people in high income groups. According to Ali, (2012) negative relationship 
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between defense spending and income inequality would be because of “… One possible 
interpretation could be that the military establishment in MENA (including Iran) countries is 
entrenched in all aspect of the society and it is complicated to parse-out the efficient from the 
inefficient allocations of the societal resources. Other possible interpretation could be that this 
negative impact of military expenditure on inequality might capture the equity side of military 
industrialization at the expense of efficiency. Also this negative relationship could be indicative 
of attempts by governments to consolidate their power by providing more subsidies and social 
programs while on the other hand, they are offering the stick by boosting military expenditures.” 
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Footnotes 
1. Chaitanya has explained Opportunity Cost Burden Effect Model with help of diagram. 
2. The results of all studies regarding unit root properties of the variables are biased. The 
traditional unit root tests do not have information regarding structural break stemming in 
the series. 
3. See Tiwari and Shahbaz, (2012); Shahbaz et al. (2012)  
4. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
5. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and South Korea 
6. The structural breaks are based on Clemente et al. (1998) 
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